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ESSAYS
A CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PATRIOT ACT EXTENDERS
DANIEL E. LUNGREN*
In the wake of 9/11, Congress was presented with the chal-
lenge of meeting its responsibility to protect the American public
from future terrorist attacks. In seeking to fulfill this obligation,
three critical provisions were enacted into law concerning the
authority to use roving wiretaps, access to business records, and the
so-called "lone wolf' provision. These three elements of the law
contained sunset provisions which were extended in the
reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act in the 109th Congress, the
111th Congress, and most recently in the 112th Congress. The
requirement of priorjudicial approval for their use and the exercise
of vigorous oversight has been essential to continued support for
these "extenders" within Congress. In the end, providing our
nation's intelligence officials with these tools serves both the secur-
ity and liberty interests of the American public.
The date 9/11 is one that is indelibly etched in the minds of
all Americans who witnessed that horrific day. It represents a
date in our nation's history when we came face to face with an
evil which forced us to recognize that others with premeditation
and malice would enter our country with the purpose of killing
innocent civilians.' The ability to carry out such a plot was facili-
* Member, U.S. House of Representatives, Third District of California;
Chairman, House Administration Committee; Member, House Committee on
Homeland Security, House Committee on the Judiciary. A.B., University of
Notre Dame (1968);J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (1971).
1. See THE LONG SHADOW OF 9/11: AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 3
(Brian Michael Jenkins & John Paul Godges eds., 2011). The editors note:
The long shadow of 9/11 sometimes makes it difficult to recall what
things were like before terrorists crashed hijacked airliners into New
York skyscrapers and the Pentagon, killing thousands. The United
States had been concerned about the growing phenomenon of terror-
ism since the late 1960s and had played a major role in international
efforts to combat it. Terrorism escalated in the 1980s and 1990s as
terrorists increasingly demonstrated their determination to kill in
427
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tated by the absence of an appropriate legal framework to pre-
vent the commission of such horrendous acts. A national
security apparatus established to meet the challenges posed dur-
ing the Cold War era was exposed as inadequate to respond to
the very different threat posed by non-state actors whose method
of operation is characterized by a conspiratorial effort to thwart
detection.
Similarly, an investigation of suspected terrorists can also
present quite distinct challenges from those encountered in a
traditional criminal case. Perhaps most importantly, a criminal
investigation often follows the commission of the crime. By con-
trast, the very purpose of an investigation into potential terrorist
acts is to prevent potentially cataclysmic events before they take
place.' As Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit United
States Court of Appeals explains:
The aim of national security intelligence is to thwart
attacks by enemy nations of terrorist groups rather than
just to punish the perpetrators after an attack has
occurred. The threat of punishment is not a reliable deter-
rent to such attacks, especially when the attackers are fanat-
ics who place a low value on their own lives and when the
potential destructiveness of such attacks is so great that
even a single failure of deterrence can have catastrophic
consequences. That is why, when government is fighting
terrorism rather than ordinary crime, the emphasis shifts
from punishment to prevention.
Furthermore, the public nature of the offense is a distinct
aspect of terrorism. A terrorist act is committed with the very
idea of creating as much damage and disruption as possible. The
mens rea of the offense entails a specific intent to kill civilians
with the further purpose of inflicting a mass psychological
wound. This is distinct from the burglar who enters a dwelling
under the cover of darkness, or the circumstances where one
perpetrates a murder from a position of "lying in wait." While
both types of offense involve personal and public harm, the for-
quantity and their willingness to kill indiscriminately. Terrorist attacks
on American targets abroad had already provoked a military response
on several occasions, but these were single actions.
Id.
2. See Remarks on Signing the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, 2 Pub. Papers
1306-07 (Oct. 26, 2001) (statement of President George W. Bush) ("The bill
before me takes account of the new realities and dangers posed by modern
terrorists. It will help law enforcement to identify, to dismantle, to disrupt, and
to punish terrorists before they strike.").
3. RIcHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT 92 (2006).
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mulation of sound public policy must not ignore the gravity of
the harm caused to the body politic by the failure to prevent the
terrorist act.
In this context, foundational questions about the purpose of
government itself are raised. On the basis of social contractarian
legitimacy, the principle justification of the state lies in its
responsibility to protect its citizens from harm by those outside of
its jurisdictional boundaries. On the basis of natural rights the-
ory, the protection of life is a properly basic good. Of those
rights endowed by our Creator, the right to life is paramount in
that without it others are rendered superfluous. The Preamble
of our nation's Basic Law affirms such a role in acknowledging
the responsibility of government to provide for the common
defense.' Although our adversary may involve individuals or con-
spirators, it is the nature of the threat to society and our way of
life which presents government with a responsibility to protect its
citizens.
From the outset, it must also be acknowledged that the
nature of this responsibility should be seen as a prudential safe-
guard of other rights and as a necessary precondition for human
flourishing within society. One of the distinct aspects of the chal-
lenge posed by terrorism is that the murder of large numbers of
people is done with the aim of disrupting the major institutions
and the legal norms of its target. Those who have committed
themselves to a nihilistic ideology at the same time have
attempted to exploit the vulnerabilities and openness of free
societies. We must always remember what it is that they seek to
destroy in our effort to defeat them. In the end the alleged
dichotomy between security and liberty is a false one. For only by
respecting both will any definition of success be possible.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A critical aspect of the response to 9/11 involved a reassess-
ment and reform of the tools available to federal officials neces-
sary to enhance foreign intelligence and law enforcement
surveillance authority. The Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT ACT" or
"PATRIOT Act") was signed into law by then-President George
W. Bush on October 26, 2001.' A subsequent response to the
attack involved the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and
4. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
5. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT
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Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ("IRTPA").6 Among other
things, new section 6001 of IRTPA' added those "engage [d] in
international terrorism" to the list of categories of persons who
are considered "agents of a foreign power" under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA").8 As a safeguard against
potential abuse, sixteen sections of Title II of the PATRIOT Act9
and section 6001 of IRTPAm were scheduled to expire on
December 31, 2005.
Although it became necessary in the 109th Congress to
extend the sunset deadlines to February 3, 2006," and then later
until March 10, 2006,12 by March 9 the legislation was sent to
ACT), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.).
6. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
7. Id. § 6001 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (Supp. III 2009)).
8. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C).
9. USA PATRIOT ACT § 224, 115 Stat. at 295. Section 102(a) of the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
120 Stat. 192, repeals section 224 of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 that had
mandated sixteen of its sections to expire on December 31, 2005 (later
extended to March 10, 2006, by Pub. L. No. 109-170, 120 Stat. 3 (2006)).
Thus, section 102(a) of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization
Act of 2005 made permanent the following fourteen sections of the USA
PATRIOT ACT: section 201 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")
wiretapping in certain terrorism investigations), section 202 (ECPA wiretapping
in computer fraud and abuse investigations), section 203(b) (law enforcement
sharing of court-ordered wiretap-generated foreign intelligence information
wiretap information), section 203(d) (law enforcement sharing of foreign intel-
ligence information notwithstanding any other legal restriction), section 204
(Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) pen register order
amendments including extension to electronic communications, e.g., Internet
use), section 207 (duration of FISA wiretap and search orders involving agents
of a foreign power), section 209 (seizure of stored voice-mail by warrant rather
than ECPA order), section 212 (communications providers emergency disclo-
sures of communications content or related records to authorities), section 214
(technical exception for foreign intelligence pen register/trap and trace device
use), section 217 (law enforcement access to computer trespassers' communica-
tions within the intruded system), section 218 (FISA wiretap or search orders
with an accompanying law enforcement purpose; removal of "the wall" of sepa-
ration between criminal catchers and spy catchers), section 220 (nationwide
service of court orders directed to communication providers), section 223 (civil
liability and disciplinary action for certain ECPA or FISA violations), section
225 (civil immunity for assistance in executing a FISA order).
10. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act § 6001.
11. Act of Dec. 30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-160, 119 Stat. 2957.
12. Act of Feb. 3, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-170, 120 Stat. 3.
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President Bush and was signed into law.' 3 As a member of the
House Judiciary Committee, I worked to permanently extend
fourteen of the sixteen expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
At the time, it was my view that the larger debate concerning the
appropriate scope of government authority under the PATRIOT
Act warranted a more cautious approach to the extension of the
PATRIOT Act's section 206 roving wiretap provision," and the
section 215 business records provision.' 5  The 2005-06
13. The House agreed to the conference report accompanying H.R. 3199
on December 14, 2005. 151 CONG. RiEc. 28,306 (2005). But due to a failure to
invoke cloture in the Senate, 151 CONG REc. 28,818 (2006), it was necessary for
Congress to enact legislation to postpone the three expiring provisions until
February 3. See 151 CONG. REc. 30,923 (2005) (House consideration and pas-
sage of extension); 151 CONG. Rrc. 30,917 (2005) (Senate concurrence in the
House Amendment); Pub. L. No. 109-160, 119 Stat. 2957 (2005). Thereafter,
the expiring provisions were further extended until March 10. See 152 CONG.
REc. 573 (2006) (House passage under suspension of the rules); 152 CONG.
REc. 745-46 (2006) (Senate consideration and passage); Pub. L. No. 109-170,
120 Stat. 3 (2006). On March 1, 2006, the Senate passed a separate bill, S. 2271,
which included three provisions which were not included in the conference
report. 152 CONG. Ric. 2300 (2006). This enabled the Senate to invoke cloture
and to pass the conference report on March 2, 2006. See 152 CONG. Rrc. 2418
(2006). Under the Suspension of the House Rules, the House passed S. 2271
on March 7, 2006, 152 CONG. REc. 2785-86 (2006), and both H.R. 3199 and S.
2271 were signed into law by the President, USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
14. USA PATRIOT ACT § 206, 115 Stat. at 282 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
1805(c) (2) (B) (2006)) authorizes Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act orders
to direct "other persons" to assist with electronic surveillance if "the Court
finds, based on specific facts provided in the application, that the actions of the
target . . . may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a specified
person." Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
108, § 314(a)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001) amended 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c)(1) (B) to provide that the order must specify the location or the sur-
veillance if the facilities or places are known. USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthroization Act of 2005, § 108(b) (4), 120 Stat. at 203 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c) (3)), requires that the FISA Court be told the nature and location of
each new facility or place, the facts and circumstances relied upon tojustify the
new surveillance, a statement of any proposed minimization procedures that
differ from those contained in the original application, and the number of facil-
ities or places subject to surveillance under the authority of the present order.
15. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthroization Act § 106(b),
120 Stat. at 196. The section 215 amendments in the 2005-06 authorization
adopted the standard to require a statement of facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to a
foreign intelligence, international terrorism, or espionage investigation.
Records are presumptively relevant if they pertain to a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power
who is the subject of such authorized investigation; or an individual in contact
with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of
such authorized investigation. Id.
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reauthorization would also provide a sunset of the lone wolf pro-
vision of IRTPA.16 I felt that Congress had a solemn responsibil-
ity to the public to seek a course which would maximize support
for our efforts to thwart another attack. In this regard, it was
imperative for us to act in a fashion that was most likely to pro-
duce legislation which would have legitimacy in the eyes of the
American public.
An integral aspect of the logic of sunsets was that they would
entail a vigorous exercise of the oversight function of Congress.
In a government based upon the concept of separation of pow-
ers, it is imperative for the legislative branch to ensure that duly
enacted statutes are implemented as intended. This is of particu-
lar importance with respect to legislation such as the PATRIOT
Act, where controversy over allegations of abuse have been raised
by critics of the law. The pendency of an expiration date pro-
vides additional incentives for the exercise of oversight and scru-
tiny." Although, evidence in support of these assertions was not
6. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 6001(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(b)(1)(C)), provides that persons, other than U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, engaged in international terrorism are presumptively considered to
be agents of a foreign power.
17. H.R. Rep. No. 109-174, pt. 1, at 5 (2005), from the 109th Congress
reports:
H.R. 3199 is based on four years of extensive oversight consisting of
hearing testimony, Department of Justice Inspector General reports,
briefings, and oversight correspondence. Since April of this year
alone, this Committee has heard testimony from 35 witnesses during
11 hearings on the USA PATRIOT ACT. That testimony and related
oversight has demonstrated that the USA PATRIOT ACT has been an
effective tool against both terrorists and criminals intent on harming
innocent people, and therefore deserves to be reauthorized with some
modifications. H.R. 3199 accomplishes this objective by reauthorizing
provisions set to sunset and making some improvements.
Two legislative hearings were held on the subject of the USA PATRIOT ACT
during the 111th Congress. The first met on September 22, 2009. USA
PATRIOT ACT: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. (2009). The second, before the full Judiciary Com-
mittee, conducted a classified briefing for Members of Congress on October 29,
2009.In the 112th Congress, the Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security held three hearings on the USA
PATRIOT ACT on March 9, 2011, March 30, 2011, and May 11, 2011. Testi-
mony was received from the following people: Mr. Todd Hinnen, U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice; Mr. Robert S. Litt, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence; Professor Nathan Sales, George Mason University; Mr. Julian
Sanchez, Cato Institute; Mr. Kenneth Wainstein, O'Melveny & Myers, LLP; Mr.
Michael German, American Civil Liberties Union; Mr. Patrick Rowan,
McGuireWoods LLP; The Honorable Bob Barr, former Member of Congress;
Mr. Bruce Fein, Campaign for Liberty; and Sergeant Ed Mullins, Sergeant
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proffered before the House Judiciary Committee, Congressional
oversight is nonetheless indispensible if Congress is to fulfill its
responsibility within the constitutional framework of checks and
balances.
Unfortunately, the 111th Congress failed to act with the
appropriate level of dispatch concerning the extension of the
expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act and IRTPA. A short
term extension until February 28, 2010 was attached to the FY
2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act." As that expi-
ration date approached, Congress once again passed a temporary
extension, pushing the reauthorization of these expiring provi-
sions off onto the next Congress."
Thus, upon being sworn in, the new Congress had a little
over a month to act before the expiration of the sunset date on
February 28. This was to prove more complicated than antici-
pated. The House attempted to pass an extension of the three
expiring provisions under a suspension of the House rules. This
process, designed for the passage of noncontroversial bills,
proved to be ill-suited for consideration of the PATRIOT Act,
and the legislation failed to garner the necessary two-thirds sup-
port required.2 0 The House of Representatives had just previ-
ously gone through an historic shift in the composition of its
membership and a change in its leadership. There was a clear
sentiment among House Members that they wanted the oversight
responsibilities of the House to be exercised by the House Judici-
ary Committee. With such assurances, the House passed another
temporary extension after concurring with Senate language
which moved the sunset date to May 27, 2011.21
Benevolent Association of New York City. Additional materials were submitted
by: the American Civil Liberties Union, Keep America Safe, the Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents
Association, the Cato Institute, the Sergeants Benevolent Association of New
York City, the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, the National Associa-
tion of Assistant United States Attorneys, and the Association of State Criminal
Investigative Agencies. H.R. REP. No. 112-79, at 3-4 (2011).
18. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub L. No. 111-
118, § 1004, 123 Stat. 3409, 3470. (passage by House, 155 CONG. REC.
H15,419-20 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2009); passage by Senate, 155 CONG. REC.
S13,472-77 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2009)).
19. Act of Feb. 27, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-141, 124 Stat. 37; 156 CONG.
RE~c. S736-37 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2010), 156 CONG. REc. H848-49 (daily ed. Feb.
25, 2010).
20. 157 CONG. REc. H520-28 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2011).
21. FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5
(amendment and passage by Senate, 157 CONG. REc. S727-31 (daily ed. Feb 15,
2011); passage by House 157 CONG. Rhc. H1075-79 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2011)).
434 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 26
The Senate Judiciary Committee then acted by reporting S.
193, which, among other things, extended the three expiring
provisions until December 31, 2013.22 Furthermore, the Senate
bill also would have applied the sunset provision to national
security letters, which are a form of administrative subpoena.23
Although Chairman James Sensenbrenner of the House Judici-
ary Committee, Crime Subcommittee did conduct oversight
hearings concerning the other non-expiring provisions of the
PATRIOT Act, the specific charge of our committee was seen to
be the extension of the provisions facing a sunset. Our commit-
tee reported H.R. 1800, which would have extended the roving
wiretap and business records provisions of the PATRIOT Act
until December 31, 2017, and would have made the "lone wolf'
provision of the bill permanent.24 As a cosponsor of the legisla-
tion and the original author of the sunset provisions in the
House version of the PATRIOT Act in the 109th Congress, it was
and remains my view that no justification has been offered as to
why the lone wolf provision should not be made a permanent
feature of our law. Furthermore, as will be discussed, there is
much evidence that the stateless actor with no formal ties to
groups may represent a new and increasingly dangerous aspect
of the terrorist threat.
In the end, despite issues relating to the business records
provisions of the PATRIOT Act, the Senate passed S. 990,25
which then was approved by the House on May 26, 2011, provid-
ing for an extension of section 206 (roving wiretap), section 215
(business records), and section 6001 of IRTPA (lone wolf) until
June 1, 2015.26
An argument could certainly be made that we have had a
sufficient amount of experience with the PATRIOT Act extend-
22. USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Extension Act of 2011, S. 193, 112th Cong.
(2011). S. 193 would have extended Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act and the three expiring provisions until December 31, 2013. It would
also have made changes to the expiring authorities, national security letters and
other provisions of the PATRIOT Act. Id. § 2.
23. Id.
24. H.R. 1800, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
25. S. 990, 112th Cong. (2011); 157 CONG. REC. S3367-3402 (daily ed.
May 26, 2011). The Senate had attempted to pass S. 1038, which would have
provided a four year extension of the expiring provisions, but that bill was
tabled on May 24, 2011. S. 1038, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). Two days later, the
Senate passed the text of S. 1038 as an amendment in the nature of a substitute
to S. 990. Before the substitute amendment, S. 990 had been a Small Business
Administration reauthorization bill that had passed both the Senate and House
in different versions. S. 990, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
26. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125
Stat. 216 (House passage, 157 CONG. REc. H3738-46 (daily ed. May 26, 2011)).
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ers to make them permanent features of our national security
law. From the standpoint of our intelligence gathering profes-
sionals, there is much to be said concerning the advantages of
continuity and predictability of the law.2 On the other hand, in
a democracy it is of vital importance that the public have confi-
dence and the assurance that the legitimate interest we have in
securing our nation from another attack is effected in a manner
consistent with our values and legal tradition. This of course
includes a willingness to consider the views of dissenting voices.2"
The debate which took place in the 112th Congress over the
extension of these expiring provisions embodied a thorough
examination and exchange of views concerning both the effec-
tiveness of the PATRIOT Act and its impact on the liberty inter-
ests of the American people. In the end, the extension of the
three expiring provisions represented a recognition that liberty
27. See Oversight Hearing on the Fed. Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on the judiciary, 112th Cong. (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear 03162011 .html. FBI Director Robert Muel-
ler made the following point:
[H]aving a sunset provision contributes a degree of uncertainty in the
months going up to when that provision is to be reauthorized that is
unsettling and disturbing in the sense that you don't know where your
investigations will be at a particular time when it comes up for Con-
gress' reauthorization. And consequently and quite obviously, we pre-
fer not to have that uncertainty, not to have that question about what
will be our powers down the road.
Id.; see also Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 51
(2011). Robert S. Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence:
I think from the intelligence community's point of view we certainly
share the hope that we can reach the stage where these authorities can
be authorized on a permanent basis. From our point of view, while we
encourage oversight, having to run up against repeated expirations is
not something that we particularly enjoy doing. I guess at the generic
level, I can share the sentiment that I hope we get to the stage where
we all agree on what the appropriate way is that we can authorize these
permanently. We may disagree as to what the details of that are.
Id.
28. See USA PATRIOT Act: Dispelling the Myths: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
68-83 (2011) (statement of Bruce Fein, Campaign for Liberty) (representative
of the testimony received that was critical of the USA PATRIOT ACT); see also
id. 21-68 (statement of former Rep. Bob Barr, opposing sunsetted provisions of
the PATRIOT ACT); Permanent Provisions of the PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 31 (statement of Michael German, Policy Counsel for National
Security and Privacy, American Civil Liberties Union); Reauthorization of the
PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 36-44 (statement of Julian Sanchez, Research
Fellow, Cato Institute).
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and security presuppose an equipoise which must be secured
from those who seek to destroy both.
II. ROVING WIRETAPS
A roving or multi-point wiretap is tied to individuals and
enables intelligence officials to obtain a single order that covers
any communications device used by the target of the surveil-
lance. In the absence of such authority, government officials
would be required to seek a new court order every time a change
in the location, phone, or computer occurred."
The issue of roving wiretaps raises the classic dilemma of
technology outpacing the evolution of the law. To put this issue
in its historical context, at the time of the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978, our nation was in the midst
of a cold war with another nation-state in a bi-polar world. Com-
munications were then carried out with devices which would
hardly be recognized today as a telephone. The revolutionary
advances that we have seen in communications technology have
benefited both personal and commercial life, while at the same
time presenting intelligence officials with new and evolving chal-
lenges. We have come a long way beyond the contemplation of
most, excluding perhaps a few prescient science fiction writers.
For example, the use of prepaid or disposable cell phones has
changed the rules of the game. While ongoing technological
innovation forced changes to our criminal laws, the demands
placed upon the intelligence community have been equally net-
tlesome, if not more so. This is the context within which roving
or multi-point wiretaps arose in the national security arena.
Under normal circumstances in applying for a wiretap, when
the government appears before the FISA Court, it must demon-
strate probable cause that a subject is a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power and uses a facility such as a telephone num-
ber.so If the court approves the request, it will issue two orders-
the first to the government authorizing the surveillance, and the
second to the telephone company with an order to provide assis-
tance to the government."' However, if the government is able
to demonstrate that the subject may take steps to thwart surveil-
lance (e.g., switching telephone companies), the court may also
29. See H.R. RiEP. No. 112-79, at 2 (2011).
30. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2) (Supp. III 2009); Reauthorization of the
PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 8-9 (statement of Todd M. Hinnen, Acting
Assistant Att'y Gen., Nat'l Security Div., Dep't of Justice).
31. Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 12 (statement of
Todd M. Hinnen).
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issue a roving or multi-point order which can be served on the
new provider without first going back to the court." After the
government identifies the new number used by the subject and
initiates surveillance, it is required to notify the FISA Court
within ten days."
One of the significant accomplishments of the PATRIOT
Act was to tear down the so-called wall between law enforcement
and intelligence concerning the sharing of information." In this
same regard, there is little reason to deny those in the intelli-
gence community the tools that are available to law enforcement
officials. Since 1986, law enforcement has been able to use rov-
ing or multipoint wiretaps to investigate ordinary crimes, includ-
ing drug offenses and racketeering." In fact, even the Ninth
Circuit-known for its liberal jurispridence-has upheld roving
wiretaps in the criminal context against a Fourth Amendment
challenge.3 6 Section 206 of the PATRIOT Act simply authorized
the same techniques in national security investigations. When
one considers that the aim of those who are plotting terrorist acts
is to inflict death on large numbers of innocent people in order
to impose further psychological damage on the larger society,
there is ample justification for doing so. As Professor Sales put it
in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Ter-
rorism, and Homeland Security, "[i]f a roving wiretap is good
enough for Tony Soprano, it is good enough for Mohamed
Atta."3 7
In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act concerning the permissible use of
electronic surveillance in criminal cases.3 It is noteworthy that
its scope did not reach national security cases and that the Act
explicitly provided that the criminal wiretap laws did not affect
32. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (2) (B).
33. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (3); Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note
27, at 12 (statement of Todd M. Hinnen, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Nat'l
Security Div., Dep't of Justice).
34. Permanent Provisions of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 28, at 6 (statement
of Todd M. Hinnen, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Nat'l Security Div., Dep't of
Justice).
35. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 106(d)(3), 100 Stat. 1848, 1857 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518 (2006)).
36. United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1992).
37. Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 24 (statement of
Nathan A. Sales, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.).
38. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
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the President's constitutional duty to protect national security.3"
The specific provisions of Title III should not be construed to
limit the scope of what was deemed permissible outside of the
context of criminal cases nor to define the specific response to
cases which were not contemplated by the Act.
It is not accidental that Title III followed in the wake of what
is perhaps the seminal Supreme Court ruling in modern Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. In Katz v. United States, the Court
held that the protections of the Fourth Amendment extended to
electronic surveillance of oral communications despite the
absence of a physical trespass.4 0 The Court, however, did not
extend its holding to cases involving national security. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, observed that "[w]hether safe-
guards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would sat-
isfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case."" Justice White
offered a similar disclaimer in his concurrence with the
majority. 2
This is not to suggest that the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated in the collection of intelligence. In United States v.
United States District Court, the United States Supreme Court held
that in the case of domestic national security surveillance, prior
judicial approval is required to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
39. Id. § 2511(3). Section 2511(3) provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the Presi-
dent to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a for-
eign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essen-
tial to the security of the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything
contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary or to
protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present
danger to the structure or existence of the Government.
Id.
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
41. Id. at 358 n.23.
42. Id. at 363 (White, J. concurring) ("In this connection ... the Court
points out that today's decision does not reach national security cases.").
43. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 319-21
(1972). Writing for the Majority, Justice Powell explained:
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if
domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the dis-
cretion of the Executive Branch. . . . The historical judgment, which
the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discre-
tion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evi-
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In such cases, the Court deferred to Congress to develop stan-
dards for domestic intelligence that were distinct from those
established for criminal investigations under Title III."
Finally, in drawing a clear line between domestic and for-
eign intelligence gathering, the Court observed that:
We emphasize, before concluding this opinion, the scope
of our decision. As stated at the outset, this case involves
only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not
addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which
may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers
or their agents.45
Thus, in what has come to be known as the Keith case, the
court expressed no opinion concerning the scope of the Fourth
Amendment with respect to issues involving foreign powers or
their agents.
In general, the procedures under Title III are similar to
those of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as amended by
section 206. However, unlike criminal cases where the question
relates to probable cause that a crime is being or is about to be
committed, the issue before a FISA Court relates to whether (1)
there is probable cause that the subject of an investigation is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and (2) probable
cause that the device is being used or is about to be used by a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.4 6 Under section
206, the FISA Court order must describe the specific target in
detail when authorizing a roving wiretap for a suspect whose
dence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech.
Id. at 316-17. It should be noted that the procedures contained within section
206 are enacted by Congress and signed into law by the President. Further-
more, an order under section 206 must be approved by the FISA Court before it
can be executed.
44. Id. at 322-23. As the Court explained:
Given these potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveil-
lances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to
consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those
already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different standards
may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable
both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence
information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant
application may vary according to the governmental interest to be
enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.
Id.
45. Id. at 321-22.
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2) (Supp. III 2009).
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identity is not known.4 7 The Act recognizes that it is the very
actions of the subject of the investigation to thwart surveillance,
which renders his or her identity unascertainable.48 Further-
more, the FISA Court must be informed of the nature and loca-
tion of each new facility or place, and the facts and circumstances
relied upon to justify the new surveillance," and provided with a
statement of any proposed minimization procedures50 that differ
from those in the original order.
Similarly, with regard to the issue of notification, section 206
recognizes an obvious distinction between criminal cases and
those involving foreign powers and agents of a foreign power. If
the notice provisions of Title III were applied in the context of
an investigation of a terror suspect, intelligence officials would
47. USA PATRIOT ACT; Pub. L. No. 107-56. § 206, 115 Stat. 272, 282
(2001); see also Oversight Hearing on the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 27.
FBI Director Robert Mueller explained:
We have to go to the judge with sufficient information to identify this
individual from all other individuals. We may not have an accurate
name . . . but nonetheless, we may have been surveilling him for a
period of time. We may have information on somebody. The name is
affixed to this particular person, but we don't know the true name.
But we, in order to get the warrant, have to have sufficient specificity
to identify this individual from all others.
Id.
48. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (2) (B).
49. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-177, § 108(b) (4), 120 Stat. 192, 203 (2006) (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(3)). The government normally must demonstrate to the
FISA Court within ten days of initiating surveillance of the new facility that
probable cause exists to tie the target to the new facility. For "good cause" the
notification period may be extended for up to 60 days. See also Oversight Hearing
on the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 27 (statement of FBI Director Rob-
ert Mueller).
50. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005
§ 106(g)( 2 ), 120 Stat. at 199 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)
(Supp. III 2009)); Reauthorization of the PATRIOTAct, supra note 27, at 56 (ques-
tioning of Todd M. Hinnen, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Nat'l Security Div.,
Dep't ofJustice). Minimization relates to the excising of information concern-
ing U.S. persons:
In a criminal context, real-time minimization is required. In other
words, an agent literally listens to the phone call, and if it appears to
be a call to mom about picking up milk on the way home, the call is
dropped. Because Congress recognized that spies and terrorists don't
always operate that way, there may be language issues, there may be
issues of talking in code, there may be tradecraft issues, the FISA stat-
ute does not require real-time minimization. It requires after-the-fact
minimization.
Id.
51. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005
§ 108 (b) (4).
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be required to notify the suspect within the required period of
time that the surveillance had taken place.12 Such a scenario
would undermine the intelligence gathering process. By con-
trast, under section 206, the supervision requirement of the FISA
Court after the required notification is actuated provides further
assurance of compliance with the purpose of the law.5 3
Critics of section 206 have made the argument that even if
the case for roving wiretaps has been established, it is superfluous
because of the available alternative of obtaining a warrant under
Title III. In testimony before the House Judiciary Committee,
FBI Director Robert Mueller addressed this question:
On the title III and criminal side, you are looking for a
person who has committed or is in the process of commit-
ting a crime. On the national security side, you are trying
to prevent that terrorist act and identify that person as a
terrorist....
There is another aspect to it and that is often on the
counter-terrorism side and since September 11th, we inte-
grate information from the CIA, NSA, and other intelli-
gence entities. There are provisions on the national
security side to protect that information, the sources and
the methods that you do not have on the criminal side.
And consequently the mechanisms we have on the FISA
Court and FISA statute to allow us to do often that which
cannot be done on the criminal side, and where the focus
is an agent of a foreign power, the agent of a foreign power
in this case being a terrorist.54
Director Mueller's statement captures with great clarity the
stakes involved in terrorist surveillance cases. Unlike criminal
cases where someone is committing or has committed a crime,
intelligence officials are in the prevention business-stopping a
potentially catastrophic act before it takes place. In order to
accomplish this objective, the protection of sources and methods
of intelligence collection are a matter of paramount concern.
It is important to understand that a section 206 roving or
multi-point wiretap must be obtained from the FISA Court. The
court itself is comprised of federal judges appointed by the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court." The 2005 amend-
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2006).
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c) (3) (2006).
54. Oversight Hearing on the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 27 (state-
ment of Robert Mueller, FBI Director).
55. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511,
§ 103, 92 Stat. 1783, 1788 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006 & Supp. III
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ments to the PATRIOT Act provided an extra layer of judicial
review as additional insurance that intelligence officials will not
abuse this multi-point authority." The requirement in the stat-
ute of a description of the suspect and the nature and location of
each new facility dispel any argument that a roving order is some-
how tantamount to a general warrant." Furthermore, it goes
without saying that terrorists use various forms of different com-
munication devices in order to conceal themselves and their
communications. Such efforts to avoid detection must not be
rewarded by doctrinaire legal theory divorced from the violent
world of facts. Section 206 represents a reasonable response to
the obligation to protect the public within the parameters of
well-settled law.
III. SECTION 215 BUSINESS RECORDS
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amended the business
records section of FISA to authorize the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation or his or her designee to apply to the
FISA Court in order to obtain an order granting intelligence offi-
cials access to "any tangible things" (including books, records,
2009)); see also Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 22 (state-
ment of Robert Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of Dir. of National Intelligence).
The FISA Court is composed of eleven Article III judges selected from
districts around the country and appointed by the ChiefJustice of the
United States for seven-year terms. As noted above, the judges of the
FISA Court engage in a thorough and searching review of every FISA
application to ensure that the application complies with the statutory
standards. Moreover, the FISA Court not only approves the use of
these authorities, it also takes an active role in ensuring that the gov-
ernment is complying with the FISA Court orders, by regularly review-
ing the activities approved, prescribing procedures that agencies must
follow in executing their orders and by requiring that violations of
these procedures be reported.
Id.
56. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(3); see also 151 CONG. REC. 27,850-58 (Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference to the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005).
57. See Reauthorization of the PATRIOTAct, supra note 27, at 60 (statement
of Nathan Sales, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.)
I think we are pretty far away from the days of King George III. FISA,
as amended by the PATRIOT Act, doesn't allow the sort of general
warrant dragnets that our founders justifiably worried about 200 years
ago. That is not the situation that FISA authorizes. In all cases, FISA,
as amended by the PATRIOT Act, requires probable cause to believe
that the target is an agent of a foreign power, i.e., somebody who is a
spy or a terrorist. That seems like it meets the particularity require-
ment pretty precisely to me.
Id.
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papers, and other documents) no matter who holds it in foreign
intelligence, international terrorism, and clandestine intelli-
gence cases.58 The applicable standard adopted by Congress in
the 2005-06 reauthorization required "a statement of facts show-
ing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible
things sought are relevant to the authorized investigation.""
Records are deemed to be presumptively relevant if they pertain
to: a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; the activities
of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such
authorized investigation; or an individual in contact with, or
known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject
of such authorized investigation.co
The importance of section 215 is that it enables intelligence
officials to go before a FISA Court to demonstrate the relevance
of things like car rental records relating to travel, or purchase
records from a pharmacy where the suspect may be seeking to
obtain precursor chemicals for the construction of an explosive
device."' Such information can provide critical pieces of infor-
mation which are essential for officials to be able to connect the
dots in order to prevent terrorist acts. In testimony before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, FBI Director Mueller testi-
58. USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-62 (2006)). Prior to enactment of the
PATRIOT Act, four categories of business records were subject to compulsory
production. The FBI could seek a FISA Court order for the production of busi-
ness records from common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage
facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. 50 U.S.C. § 1861.
59. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-177, § 106(b), 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861(b) (2) (A)); see Michael J. Woods, Counterintelligence and Access to Transac-
tional Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Section 215, 1 J. NAT'L SEC.
L. & Poi'v, 37, 57 (2005). Note that in 1998, Congress amended the FISA stat-
ute 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (2) (B) (2000) to authorize the FISA Court to issue an
order for the production of documents if the application contained "specific
and articulable facts" giving reason to believe that the person to whom the
records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Then, under
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, as originally enacted, the application needed
to "specify that the records concerned [were] sought" for a foreign intelligence,
international terrorism, or espionage investigation. USA PATRIOT ACT § 215.
But then in the 2005-06 reauthorization, Congress changed the standard to
require "a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant" to a foreign intelligence,
international terrorism, or espionage investigation. USA PATRIOT Improve-
ment and Reauthorization Act § 106(b).
60. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (b) (2) (A).
61. See Oversight Hearing on the Fed. Bureau of Investigation, supra note 27
(statement of Robert Mueller, FBI Director).
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fled, "[w]e have used that provision [section 215] over 380 times
since 2001."62
The ability of intelligence officials to obtain access to busi-
ness records under section 215 has come to be known by the
misnomer of the "library provision."63 Ironically, the original
text of section 215 did not mention libraries"-it was in
response to concerns expressed about possible chilling effects on
First Amendment rights that a library-specific provision was
included in the 2005-06 reauthorization of the Act. The new
language was intended to circumscribe the use of the statute with
respect to "library circulation records, library patron lists, book
sales records, firearms sales records, tax return records, educa-
tional records, or medical records containing information that
would identify a person . . . ."" Use of section 215 with respect
to any of these categories would require approval by the Director
of the FBI, the Deputy Director, or the Executive Assistant Direc-
tor for National Security.6 " Furthermore, where the investigative
target is a U.S. person,6 7 the government must show that the
investigation is not based solely on activities protected by the
First Amendment."
It is of course noteworthy that prosecutors have the ability to
obtain records from libraries through grand jury subpoenas. As
Professor Sales testified before our subcommittee concerning
section 215:
This provision isn't aimed at libraries, though it conceiva-
bly might be applied to them, although as we have heard, it
has not yet been so. Still, that is not unusual. Grand juries
sometimes demand business records from libraries in ordi-
nary criminal investigations. Indeed, the Iowa Supreme
Court once upheld a library subpoena in a case involving
cattle mutilation. If we can investigate cattle mutilators,
62. Id.
63. See KEITH FIELS, AM. LIBRARY Ass'N, RESOLUTION ON THE USA
PATRIOT ACT AN) REIATED MEASURES THAT INFRINGE ON THE RiGHTS OF
LIBRARY USERS, (2003), available at http://www.ala.org/offices/sites/ala.org.
offices/files/content/wo/ reference/colresolutions/PDFs/01 2903-CD20. 1.pdf;
Judith King, Letter to the Editor, FBI 'Fishing Expeditions' Librarians' Biggest
Wony, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004, at A15.
64. USA PATRIOT ACT § 215; 50 U.S.C. § 1862(a)-(b).
65. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (a) (3).
66. Id.
67. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (i) (defining "United States person" as a U.S. citizen,
lawfully admitted alien for permanent residence, or U.S. corporation).
68. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (a) (1)-(a) (2) (B).
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hopefully we can investigate international terrorists using
the same [investigation] technique[s]."
No one has suggested that libraries should be targeted with
respect to terror related investigations. In fact, the 2005-06
amendments created additional safeguards beyond those which
already existed for libraries and bookstores. At the same time,
however, surely no one would suggest that libraries and booksell-
ers should be excluded from national security investigations in a
manner that has never been contemplated in criminal cases. To
do so would be to create a de facto haven for terrorists. Section
215 represents a careful and balanced approach to prevent such
a possibility while yet protecting the First Amendment rights of
the American people."o
It should also be noted that the standards and procedures
established under section 215 for obtaining an order from the
FISA Court do not implicate the Fourth Amendment." The
rationale for what has come to be known as the "third party doc-
trine" is that the disclosure of information to a third party vitiates
a reasonable expectation of privacy.72 However, Professor Orin
Kerr has argued that the better rationale can be better under-
stood in terms of the consent doctrine. As he frames the argu-
ment, "[d]isclosure to third parties eliminates protection
because it implies consent."7 3 Regardless of the rationale, this is
one of those instances where different viewpoints over public
policy do not necessarily translate into a disagreement of a con-
stitutional stature. This is not to suggest that differences over
policy are of any less importance in terms of their actual impact,
69. Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 25 (statement of
Nathan A. Sales, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.).
70. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (a) (2) (B) ("An investigation conducted under
this section shall ... not be conducted of a United States person solely upon the
basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.").
71. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.").
72. Id. at 442; see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
73. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MIcH. L. REv.
561, 565 (2009). Kerr adds that the use of third parties could give rise to a
substitution effect. Without the rule, it could enable wrongdoers to take public
aspects of their crimes and replace them with a private transaction. "Without
the third-party doctrine, savvy wrongdoers could use third-party services in a
tactical way to enshroud the entirety of their crimes in zones of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." Id. at 564.
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but rather to clarify the specific nature of the dispute over sec-
tion 215.
As previously noted, section 215 is much like a grand jury
subpoena in that it requires the recipient third party to identify
and provide the things requested by the government. It should
be recognized that section 215 authority is narrower in scope
than that of a grand jury.74 The former is limited to national
security investigations, while a grand jury can issue a subpoena
"merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not."7 5 It warrants emphasis
that a section 215 order is much more than a grand jury sub-
poena in that the order is issued by a court comprised of federal
judges. As such, we should not afford less deference to a court
comprised of independent judges than we do with respect to a
grand jury.
Along with the other protections which have been built into
section 215, one of the more obvious safeguards provides a recip-
ient of a business records production order with the ability to
challenge it." The FISA Court judge has seventy-two hours in
which to review the petition and to make a determination
whether it is frivolous.' The court is also empowered to modify
or set aside the order if it does not meet the requirements of
FISA or is otherwise unlawful." Furthermore, the recipient of a
section 215 order has the right to seek judicial review before the
FISA Court of Review and the United States Supreme Court
through a writ of certiorari.
The PATRIOT Act also contains vigorous oversight provi-
sions which are applicable to section 215." Under the terms of
the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
74. Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 25 (statement of
Nathan A. Sales, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.).
75. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950); see also
Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 25 (statement of Nathan A.
Sales, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.).
76. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f) (2) (A) (i) (2006).
77. Id. § 1861 (f) (2) (A) (ii).
78. Id. § 1861 (f) (2) (B).
79. Id. § 1861(f)(3).
80. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 112TH CONG., MARKUP OF H.R. 1800,
FISA SUNSETS REAUTHORIZATION Acr OF 2011 (Comm. Print 2011). In fact,
Congressman John Conyers, the Ranking Member of the HouseJudiciary Com-
mittee and an opponent of the PATRIOT Act extension, stated:
I also want to salute the committee in having a wide-ranging view-of
views from the witnesses yesterday on the PATRIOT Act. Conservative
witnesses like our former colleague, Bob Barr; a constitutional author-
ity, conservative, Bruce Fein, I think brought a deeper perspective to
this hearing on the PATRIOT Act than we have enjoyed before. And I
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2005, the Attorney General is required to submit an annual
report to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and the
Judiciary Committees of both bodies concerning the use of this
section. Furthermore, one of the additional oversight mecha-
nisms established by the 2005 PATRIOT Act reauthorization was
to provide audit authority for the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice relating to the FBI's use of section 215
authority.82
As a member of the House Judiciary Committee, with over-
sight responsibilities concerning the PATRIOT Act, it is my view
that these provisions of the Act are indispensable to ensuring
that the law is carried out in the manner that Congress intended.
All human institutions are fallible, as are the individuals who
work within them. It is because of this very fact that continued
vigilance is required.
In considering the safeguards built into section 215, it must
also be remembered that the privacy interests of innocent Ameri-
cans are protected under the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 as a result of the required minimiza-
tion standards which apply to section 215.83 These procedures
are intended to limit the collection and dissemination of non-
publicly available information relating to United States per-
sons.84 The purpose of the PATRIOT Act is to prevent another
heard good, probing questions coming from my colleagues, my con-
servative colleagues on this committee.
Id. at 11.
81. 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2006). The annual report is due each April and
must submit information from the previous year relating to the total number of
applications made for section 215 production orders approving requests for the
production of tangible things; the total number of such orders granted as
requested, granted as modified, or denied; and the number of 215 orders
either granted as modified, or denied for the production of library circulation
records, library patron lists, book sales records, or book customer lists, firearms
sales records, tax return records, educational records, and medical records con-
taining information that would identify a person. Id. § 1862(b).
82. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-177, § 106A, 120 Stat. 192, 200 (2006).
83. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (2006).
84. See H.R. REr. No. 109-333, at 91 (2005) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining min-
imization procedures).
[S]ection 106 directs the Attorney General to draft minimization pro-
cedures that apply to information obtained under a FISA "business
records" order. In the application for the order, the applicant must
enumerate the minimization procedures applicable to the retention
and dissemination of the tangible things sought by the FBI in the
application. Such enumerated procedures should meet the require-
ments set forth in the definition of minimization procedures found in
new subsection (g) of section 501. If the court finds that the enumer-
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cataclysmic event like that which occurred on 9/11. This has
nothing to do with spying on innocent Americans, and the pro-
tections built into section 215, along with minimization require-
ments, reinforce that objective.
Another improvement to section 215 in the 2005
reauthorization and the more recently enacted extenders in the
112th Congress, relates to the non-disclosure provisions of the
Act. Some controversy arose over the prohibition against disclo-
sure by the recipient of an order to the suspect under investiga-
tion or to other persons.8 5 In the popular nomenclature, this
came to be known as the so-called "gag order.""6 Prior to the
enactment of the 2005-06 reauthorizations, disclosure of an
order was limited to those necessary to assist in the execution of
the order. The changes to section 215 in the 109th Congress
expanded the list of those who could receive notice of an order
to include attorneys necessary to provide the recipient of the
order with legal counsel."
Furthermore, a related provision in the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 had required the
recipient of an order to disclose to the FBI upon its request, the
identities of persons to whom disclosure was made.8" Concerns
were raised at the time that this might have a "chilling effect" on
the right to seek counsel." Consequently, in reauthorizing the
PATRIOT Act in the 109th Congress, we provided an exemption
ated procedures fail to meet the requirements of subsection (g), the
Conferees expect that the court will direct that other procedures
adopted by the Attorney General be applied to the information
sought, consistent with the authority of the court specified in section
501 (c) (1), as amended.
Id.
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2006) (dismissing
as moot appeals from rulings that the gag order of the PATRIOT Act was
unconstitutional on the grounds that the 2005 USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act had cured constitutional concerns).
86. The "gag order" provision, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (d) (1), reads:
No person shall disclose to any other person that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things pursuant to an
order under this section, other than to- (A) those persons to whom
disclosure is necessary to comply with such order; (B) an attorney to
obtain legal advice or assistance with respect to the production of
things in response to the order; or (C) other persons as permitted by
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of
the Director.
87. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005
§ 106(e), 120 Stat. at 197 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (d) (1)).
88. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (d) (2) (C)).
89. 152 CONG. REc. 1806 (2006).
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concerning the required disclosure of the identity of legal coun-
sel relating to section 215 orders."
Finally, the 2006 reauthorization amendments to the Act
provided a judicial review procedure for the non-disclosure pro-
visions of section 215." After the expiration of one year, the
recipient of a business records order may petition the FISA Court
to set aside the non-disclosure requirement.9 2 This language
represented a careful balancing of the interests of disclosure to
others and the compelling need to prevent a suspect from being
tipped off that he or she is under investigation. It is important to
remember that we are dealing with national security cases involv-
ing persons with certain specified connections to a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power and that the order to produce this
transactional information began with the court.
The business records provisions of section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act have drawn an inordinate amount of attention for
reasons which are largely unrelated to the actual language in the
statute." Abstract principles, lacking correspondence with legis-
lative language, all too often produce more heat than light. The
use of such principles in public policy debate has an understand-
able appeal. However, where the stakes are so high and where
our intelligence professionals are expected to get it right every
time, more is required. The extension of the business records
section by the 112th Congress was not aimed at libraries and did
not entail any changes in the law relating to national security let-
ters.94 Although these are both important matters of public con-
90. USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178, § 4(a), 120 Stat. 278, 280 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861(d) (2) (C)).
91. Id. § 3 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)).
92. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i).
93. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 45-50.
An exchange with one of the witnesses before the subcommittee is illustrative of
this point:
Mr. GOWDY. You are upset about national security letters, but that is
not part of what we are doing.
Mr. SANCHEZ. I was tying those with-
Mr. GOWDY. But that is not part of this reauthorization.
Mr. SANCHEZ. That is true.
Id. at 49.
94. A national security letter ("NSL") is essentially an administrative sub-
poena issued by a federal agency requiring the production of information by
third party custodians. See Permanent Provisions of the PATRIOT Act, supra note
28, at 13 (prepared statement of Todd M. Hinnen, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Nat'l Security Div., Dep't of Justice). NSLs are authorized on the basis of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 18 U.S.C. § 2709; the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) 12 U.S.C. § 3414; the Fair Credit Reporting Act
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cern, they were unrelated to the extension of section 215 and the
other two expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
This is not to suggest that the business records language
should not be scrutinized with the highest degree of care. That
is a solemn responsibility of Congress in exercising its oversight
responsibility. After attempting to look at all of the evidence, the
109th Congress made important changes to the underlying stat-
ute that were subsequently reenacted in the 112th Congress.
It is not necessary to speculate concerning the substantive
nature of the improvements made to section 215. A number of
organizations filed suit in 2003 on the basis that section 215 vio-
lated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. 5 While legal
proceedings were pending, Congress adopted the USA PATRIOT
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which embodied
many of the changes to the act previously discussed. On October
27, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking voluntary with-
drawal of their complaint." While this in no way suggests acqui-
escence with section 215 by its critics, it does reflect the outcome
of an openness and willingness on the part of Congress to take
action where warranted to make improvements to section 215.
Both the 2005-06 reauthorization and the more recently enacted
extension of the business records provisions of the Act in the
112th Congress reflect these reforms.
IV. THE LONE WOLF PROVISION
The so-called "lone wolf' provision was originally enacted as
part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 ("IRTPA")." Although it was not a part of the original
PATRIOT Act, it was subjected to the sunset provisions of the
Act." It amends the definition of "agent of a foreign power" to
(FCRA) 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v; and the National Security Act (NSA) 50
U.S.C. § 436.
95. Muslim Cmty. Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 459 F. Supp. 2d 592, 594-95 (E.D.
Mich. 2006).
96. See Reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act, supra note 27, at 45 (statement
of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) ([W]hen the reauthorization was done, section
215 was declared unconstitutional by a Federal court. I believe it was in Michi-
gan. And after the Congress did the reauthorization that many of my friends
opposed, the plaintiffs withdrew their lawsuit.).
97. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 6001(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(b) (1) (C) (2006 & Supp. III 2009)).
98. Section 6001 (a) was originally made subject to the sunset provisions
of section 224 of the USA PATRIOT ACT. Id. § 6001(b). Section 103 of the
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 extended the
sunset on the amendment made by section 6001 by four additional years, from
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include individuals-other than U.S. persons-engaging in
international terrorism."
The purpose of the lone wolf provision is to obviate the
need to prove a specific connection between the terror suspect
and a foreign government or terrorist organization. There are
evidentiary problems connected with the burden of establishing
such a connection which give rise to the need for such a provi-
sion. The difficulty of doing so is particularly onerous during the
early stages of an investigation when intelligence officials have
yet to paint a clear picture of the suspect and his or her inten-
tions.mo1 At the same time, the government would have to have
sufficient information about the individual and his or her plans
for a terrorist act to be able to satisfy the definition of interna-
tional terrorism.101
Concerns relating to terrorist recruitment over the Internet
and the potential for self-radicalization provide the rationale for
the lone wolf provisions of the law. Those who share the ideolog-
ical tenets of radical groups such as al Qaeda, and are willing to
act on them, pose a threat to public safety regardless of whether
they are following the operational plans of a group operating on
similar presuppositions. Acting Assistant Attorney General for
the National Security Division, Todd Hinnen, explained the lone
wolf provision:
For example, it might allow surveillance when an individ-
ual acts based upon international terrorist recruitment and
training on the internet without establishing a connection
to any terrorist group. It might also be used when a mem-
ber of an international group, perhaps dispatched to the
United States to form an operational cell, breaks with the
group but nonetheless continues to plot or prepare for acts
of international terrorism.'o 2
There is simply no reason why our intelligence gathering
tools should not be used against terrorists simply because a sus-
December 31, 2005 to December 31, 2009. USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 103, 120 Stat. 192, 195
(2006).
99. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
§ 6001(a). Section 6001 amends the definition of "agent of a foreign power" to
include any non-U.S. person who "engages in international terrorism or activi-
ties in preparation therefore." See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (b) (1) (C).
100. See Reauthorization of the PATRIOTAct, supra note 27, at 33 (prepared
statement of Nathan A. Sales, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason Univ.).
101. Id. at 13 (prepared statement of Todd M. Hinnen, Acting Assistant
Att'y Gen., Nat'l Security Div., Dep't of Justice).
102. Id.
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pect is not known to be affiliated with a terrorist organization. It
is difficult but necessary for us to contemplate the unthinkable.
One individual possessing a weapon of mass destruction could
potentially pose as much of a threat to the safety and security of
the people of our nation as anyone affiliated with a foreign gov-
ernment or an organization.
The lone wolf provision, like the two other PATRIOT Act
provisions previously discussed, had its genesis with the 9/11
attack. In this regard, there has been much speculation over the
adequacy of the tools which might have been used with respect
to the so-called twentieth hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui.'s He
had been in federal custody on immigration charges and had
paid cash to learn to fly a 747 jet. Since Moussaoui had not yet
been connected to any foreign terrorist group, the question has
been raised as to whether the FBI would have had the legal
authority to search his laptop. 0 4
Although the lone wolf provision has not yet been used in
an investigation of a terror suspect, there are reasons to believe
that the lone wolf may become the future face of terrorism.'0 5 In
the House Homeland Security Committee, on which I am also
103. Id. at 25 (statement of Nathan A. Sales, Assistant Professor of Law,
George Mason Univ.).
104. Is Congress the Real "Lawbreaker"?: Reconciling EISA with the Constitution,
in Warrantless Surveillance and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: The Role of
Checks and Balances in Protecting Americans' Pivacy Rights (Part I): Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on the judiciary, 110th Cong. 54 (2007) (prepared statement of
Robert F. Turner, Univ. of Virginia School of Law). Professor Turner's pre-
pared statement remarked:
It seems very clear as well that FISA itself was a contributing factor to
the success of the 9/11 attacks. I'm sure everyone here recalls the
compelling congressional testimony of FBI lawyer Colleen Rowley,
who was named one of Time magazine's "Persons of the Year" in
2002 . . . . Most Americans never did learn the reason Rowley's
requests had been denied. There was simply no evidence that Mous-
saoui was an officer, employee, member, or agent of al Qaeda or any
other foreign terrorist organization. He was what we call a "lone wolf,"
a "sympathizer" or perhaps a "fellow-traveler." But in its wisdom, Con-
gress made it a felony for anyone in the Intelligence Community to
engage in surveillance of Moussaoui without a FISA warrant - and it
also made it illegal for the FISA Court to issue such a warrant in Mous-
saoui's case. What those contemptible FBI lawyers had done was to
obey the law passed by Congress.
Id.
105. Contra MARKUP OF H.R. 1800, supra note 80, at 11-12 (statement of
Rep. John Conyers).
We now have before us the controversial lone wolf surveillance power.
And the suggestion in the bill that is before us is that it be made per-
manent.Now, we never used it, so why do we need to make it perma-
nent? If we do have it, and I would rather debate whether we should
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privileged to serve, former 9/11 Commission member Lee Ham-
ilton warned that "[]one wolves, who are not connected to for-
mal terrorist organizations, are the most difficult to detect in part
because they do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, educa-
tional or social profile."'0o
Similarly, in testimony before the House Homeland Security
Committee, Michael E. Leiter, the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center, warned of the efforts to inspire the
cooperation of individuals with radical terrorist objectives. He
pointed out that "[s]pecifically, over the past year, AQAP [Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] released four issues of its ...
English magazine Inspire, which attempts to persuade adherence
to launch attacks on their own in the West." 0 7
There is a growing concern within the intelligence commu-
nity regarding the impact of the Internet and other new technol-
ogies on this phenomenon of self-radicalization. 0 s The
difficulty in identifying these individuals is compounded by their
mode of operation, which by definition involves an absence of
ties with other entities, specifically foreign governments or for-
mal terrorist organizations. Connecting the dots is made more
difficult simply because there are fewer dots to connect.
The potential threat posed by the lone wolf terrorist should
not be dismissed. In 2011, a twenty-year-old student from Saudi
Arabia was charged with attempting to use weapons of mass
destruction in the Dallas area.'09 Our intelligence officials must
be equipped to address this growing challenge posed by alien-
ated individuals who are attracted to the broader extremist move-
ment. There is simply no reason why this additional tool should
have it or not, but certainly not whether or not we should make it
permanent or continue it for 3 or 4 more years.
Id.
106. Threats to the American Homeland After Killing Bin Laden: An Assessment:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (pre-
pared statement of Hon. Lee Hamilton, Bipartisan Policy Center).
107. Understanding the Homeland Threat Landscape-Considerations for the
112th Congress: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 19
(2011) (statement of Michael Leiter, Dir., Nat'l Counterterrorism Ctr.).
108. Threats to the American Homeland After Killing Bin Laden: An Assessment,
supra note 106, at 68 (statement of Evan Kohlmann, Flashpoint Global Part-
ners) ("[W]e are seeing individuals who are popping up who were not recruited
by any individual cleric or any individual mosque. They are being motivated
purely by what they see on the web.").
109. See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Aldawsari, No. 5:11-MJ-017
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2011); James C. McKinley Jr. & Sarah Wheaton, Agents Say
Saudi Man Was Acting Alone in Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at A14.
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not be available simply because it is unknown whether or not a
suspect is affiliated with a terrorist organization.
President Obama discussed the magnitude of this threat in
observing that "[t] he most likely scenario that we have to guard
against right now ends up being more of a lone wolf operation
than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack."' l' He noted fur-
ther that "[w]hen you've got one person who is deranged or
driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of damage, and it's
a lot harder to trace those lone wolf operators."' The Presi-
dent's description of the evolving nature of the terrorist threat is
a sober warning which reflects the best assessment of our intelli-
gence community. The danger posed by the lone wolf is real. It
is imperative that our intelligence officials have the ability to
monitor these non-U.S. persons who present a clear and present
danger to the safety of the American public.
V. CONcLusION
The adoption of the PATRIOT Act extenders by the 112th
Congress assists with the continuing obligation of the govern-
ment to protect Americans from violent attack. While the tradi-
tional threats to national security have involved nation states,
perpetrators of terror include both state and non-state actors.
The surreptitious nature of the enterprise and the exploitation
of evolving technologies require great dexterity by intelligence
officials attempting to keep up with those dedicated to thwarting
their detection. Any measure of success in this endeavor places
the responsibility on lawmakers to assess on an ongoing basis the
continued effectiveness of the law in meeting these challenges.
Unlike the criminal law, the task is to prevent a cataclysmic event
before it happens.
Our response to the threat presented by terrorism must be
predicated upon not only the need to stop horrific events from
happening, but also upon the need to defeat its larger objective
of forcing changes in the way we live as a reaction to their mur-
derous acts. For the aim of terrorism is to inflict psychological as
well as physical harm on our society. The focus of the rage of
radical extremist ideology ultimately relates to a hatred of our
democratic values and their embodiment in our laws. Respond-
ing to this threat in a manner which reflects an understanding
110. The Situation Room: Wolf Blitzer Interview with President Barack Obama
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and appreciation for those values is thus an essential element in
confronting this ideologically driven assault on our nation and its
most deeply held beliefs.
At the same time, it is necessary to repeat what has been said
before: the attempt to characterize the responsibility of govern-
ment to protect its citizens as somehow antithetical to their lib-
erty interests is a false dichotomization. The gravity of the
potentially cataclysmic consequences of a failure to get it right
presents a threat not only to our national security, but also to the
protection of our civil liberties. All of us who are concerned
about the protection of civil liberties should be most alarmed by
the potential consequences of a successful terrorist attack on the
United States with weapons of mass destruction. This is the real
threat to civil liberties. As the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged in the Keith case, were the government to fail "to
preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so
disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered.""1
2
The 9/11 Commission itself anticipated this issue with great fore-
sight in observing that "[t] he choice between security and liberty
is a false choice, as nothing is more likely to endanger America's
liberties than the success of a terrorist attack at home."" 3 Judge
Posner explains the interrelationship between security and civil
liberties:
Civil libertarians neglect a genuine lesson of history:
that the greatest danger to American civil liberties would
be another terrorist attack on the United States, even if it
was on a smaller scale than the 9/11 attacks-but it could
be on the same or even a much larger scale....
Civil liberties depend on national security in a broader
sense. Because they are the point of balance between
security and liberty, a decline in security causes the balance
to shift against liberty. An even more basic point is that
without physical security there is likely to be very little
liberty. 14
Criticism of the PATRIOT Act should be taken seriously.
However, it should also be acknowledged that assertions without
facts fail to rise to the level of an actual argument. Those who
seek to raise the Constitution against a proven threat should have
the burden of supporting such assertions with evidence. Other-
wise the discussion devolves into mere "rights talk." In contrast
112. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
113. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 395 (2004).
114. POSNER, supra note 3, at 46-47.
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to the French Revolution, our nation was not born out of mere
abstract principles.
The Constitution is neither honored nor well-served by a
hermeneutic that presupposes a conflict with attempts to protect
the public from attack. Duly enacted statutes with built-in over-
sight-and, with respect to PATRIOT Act extenders, sunset
dates-are true to the process envisioned in our nation's Basic
Law. The fulfillment of the obligations of the executive branch
in carrying out the law is subject to the independent approval or
disapproval of the judicial branch. This system of checks and bal-
ances is the surest means of protecting the civil liberties of the
American people.
The Founders above all understood the relationship
between the provision for the common defense and the protec-
tion of liberty. The idea of redacting this fundamental purpose
of government from the law of our land would likely have been
perplexing to them. In Federalist No. 41, James Madison
cautioned:
The means of security can only be regulated by the means
and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever deter-
mined by these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preser-
vation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in the
Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every
precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary and multi-
plied repetitions."'
The necessity of self-preservation exists for the state as a
corollary of the rights of those whose consent was necessary to its
formation in the first instance. Constitutional governance
should not be seen as disabling the state from acting on behalf of
those it is obligated to defend. In short, Justice Robert Jackson
had it right in observing that the Constitution is not a suicide
pact.'
The passage of the PATRIOT Act extenders by the 112th
Congress represented a necessary response to the circumstances
confronting the United States. The death of Osama bin Laden
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 207 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009).
116. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,37 (1949) (Jackson,J.,
dissenting). The actual quote from Justice Jackson is relevant in that it is
offered as a broadside against the use of doctrinaire constitutional logic: "The
choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and
anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its
doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional
Bill of Rights into a suicide pact." Id.
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may constitute a "red letter" date in the struggle against al
Qaeda; however, the franchising of its ideology presents us with
new challenges with respect to its detection and suppression.
Continued diligence will be required if we are to be successful in
this endeavor. This diligence will be required as long as there
are those who treasure a culture of death more than they value
human life. It is most regrettable that our struggle against those
who wish to kill us does not have an expiration date. Nonethe-
less, we will once again return to the question of extending these
three expiring provisions of the law on June 1, 2015. Until then,
we can be thankful each night when we close our eyes that those
who have been entrusted to protect us have been given the tools
necessary to do so.

